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Abstract
Repeated games are difficult to analyze, especially
when agents play mixed strategies. We study one-
memory strategies in iterated prisoner’s dilemma,
then generalize the result to k-memory strategies in
repeated games. Our result shows that there always
exists a pure strategy best response, which can be
computed with SMT or MDP solvers. However,
there may not exist such pure strategy best response
in multi-agent tournaments. All source code is re-
leased for verification(see additional files).
1 Introduction
Repeated games are hard to analyze. It’s well known that
Nash equilibrium is the solution concept in one-shot games,
whereas there exist infinite Nash equilibria in repeated games
according to the folk theorem. In most repeated games, a
player responses to the previous actions of the other player,
thus the player’s strategy need to be analysed with dynamic
game theory [Han, 2018]. When the game is infinitely re-
peated, one cannot simply add up the payoff of each round,
which in general will be infinite. Average rewards or dis-
counted rewards are usually used to evaluate a strategy, and
we focus on the former in this paper.
In repeated games, a player’s strategy is a function from
histories of interactions to actions. Sometimes one re-
stricts strategies to some specific forms, such as Turing ma-
chines [Chen and Tang, 2015; Knoblauch, 1994; Megiddo
and Wigderson, 1986], finite automata [Rubinstein, 1986;
Ben-Porath, 1990; Gilboa, 1988; Zuo and Tang, 2015],
ones with limited memories [Hauert and Schuster, 1997;
Lindgren, 1992; Chen et al., 2017], and other forms of
bounded rationality (e.g. [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994;
Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008]).
A mixed strategy maps histories to a probability distribu-
tion of actions. [Press and Dyson, 2012] concluded that short-
est memory sets the rule of the game, then [Chen et al., 2017]
pointed out the best response to a k-memory strategy in in-
finitely repeated games should also be k-memory. We fur-
ther explore the best response to mixed strategies. Our result
shows that there always exists a pure strategy best response
in two-agent infinitely repeated games, but it’s not the case in
multi-agent tournaments.
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
c d
c (R,R) (S,T)
d (T,S) (P,P)
In the first place we study a concrete repeated game,
namely the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). It involves two
agents playing repeatedly the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) in ta-
ble 1. In the PD, each player can choose between Cooperate
(c) and Defect (d). If both choose c, they receive a payoff
of R (rewards); If both choose d, they receive a payoff of P
(penalty); If one chooses c and the other d, the defector re-
ceives a payoff of T (temptation to defect) and the cooperator
receives a payoff of S (sucker’s payoff). The assumption is
that T > R > P > S and that 2 ∗R > T + S, which makes
(d, d) the only equilibrium in one-shot game, but cooperation
provides more utility in the long run.
When both agents take one-memory mixed strategies, the
IPD can be modeled as a Markov chain, whose stationary dis-
tribution can be computed according to [Press and Dyson,
2012] and the best response can be solved using an SMT
solver like Z3 [De Moura and Bjørner, 2008]. We give a
method to compute the best response and then summarize the
best response to some popular strategies. In the meanwhile,
our analysis explains the behavior of evolutionary agents.
The solves a problem in [Press and Dyson, 2012] as we can
now formally prove the behaviour of these agents.
Some of our results on one-memory strategies can be gen-
eralized to k-memory mixed strategies. In order to compute
the best response to a completely mixed strategy, we build a
Markov decision process (MDP) and compute its optimal pol-
icy. Later we prove that this is a communicating MDP, which
has a pure optimal policy independent of the initial state. This
shows that there always exists a pure strategy best response
to any completely mixed strategy in a repeated game.
However, this result does not hold for tournaments with
more than two agents. We use a similar Markov chain model
to compute the best strategy in a tournament of several one-
memory agents, and show that the best response can not be a
pure strategy.
In this paper, when a strategy q is given, we calculate its
best response p. Most calculations or proofs are too labour-
some to be done manually, so we show how state-of-art com-
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puter solvers assist us in solving this classic economic prob-
lem and bringing us new insights. In most cases, our program
solved the problems in seconds. We release all our source
code for verification.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First
we study one-memory strategies of the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma. Then we model k-memory problems into MDP and
solve it with existing algorithms. Later we analyze a multi-
agent tournament which serves as a counter example. Finally
we give some discussion and concluding remarks.
2 One-Memory Strategies in IPD
2.1 One-Memory Strategies
In the section we consider a concrete example where both
players play one-memory strategies in the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD).
The PD game in Table 1 is played by two players X and
Y for infinite rounds. The score (or payoff) of either player
is calculated by average score in the limit (cf. [Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2008]). Given an infinite sequence of scores
s
(1)
i , s
(2)
i , ... for player i ∈ {X,Y }, the average score of i is
si = lim
k→∞
∑k
j=1 s
(j)
i
k
(1)
Although a player can have unlimited memory and decide
what to do based on the entire history of the interactions so
far, one-memory strategies base their response only on the
outcome of the previous round. Press and Dyson [Press and
Dyson, 2012] proved that shortest-memory player sets the
rules of the game, in the sense that, for any strategy of the
longer-memory player Y, X’s score is exactly the same as if
Y had played a certain shorter memory strategy, disregarding
any history in excess of that shared with X. This conclusion
enables us to focus on one-memory strategies.
A one-memory strategy consists of an initial state p0 (the
probability to cooperate in the first round) and a vector p =
(p1, p2, p3, p4) = (pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd) where pz is the proba-
bility of playing Cooperate when the outcome z occurred in
the previous round.
If X uses the initial probability p0 and strategy p =
(p1, p2, p3, p4), Y uses the initial probability q0 and strategy
q = (q1, q2, q3, q4), then the probability distribution of the
first iteration is v1 = (p0q0, p0(1 − q0), (1 − p0)q0, (1 −
p0)(1 − q0)) and the successive outcomes follow a Markov
chain with transition matrix given by:
M =
p1q1 p1(1− q1) (1− p1)q1 (1− p1)(1− q1)p2q3 p2(1− q3) (1− p2)q3 (1− p2)(1− q3)p3q2 p3(1− q2) (1− p3)q2 (1− p3)(1− q2)
p4q4 p4(1− q4) (1− p4)q4 (1− p4)(1− q4)

The probability distribution in r-th iteration vr over the set of
outcomes is a non-negative vector with unit sum, indexed by
four states, vr = (vrcc, v
r
cd, v
r
dc, v
r
dd) = (v
r
1, v
r
2, v
r
3, v
r
4).
Notice that we define outcome from each player’s perspec-
tive, for example, if the outcome is cd from X’s perspective,
it is dc from Y’s. v is defined from player X’s perspective,
meaning that vcd refers to X plays C and Y plays D. If the
Table 2: Outcome and Strategy
Outcome∗ cc cd dc dd
Strategy of p p1 p2 p3 p4
Strategy of q q1 q3 q2 q4
* Outcome is defined from p’s perspective
previous outcome is cd, X’s probability of cooperation is p2
while Y’s is p3. See Table 2 for this correspondence.
Thus each entry of M represents the probability of transi-
tion between different states, which satisfies
Mvr = vr+1 (2)
In accordance with [Akin, 2016], we will call M convergent
when M has a unique stationary distribution of v, which sat-
isfies,
Mv = v
[Press and Dyson, 2012] gave a determinant representation
of player’s payoff when it is calculated by the limit of average.
For an arbitrary four-vector f = (f1, f2, f3, f4) , let
D(p,q, f) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p1q1 − 1 p1 − 1 q1 − 1 f1
p2q3 p2 − 1 q3 f2
p3q2 p3 q2 − 1 f3
p4q4 p4 q4 f4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3)
Then the average payoff of sX and sY can be calculated with
payoff vector SX = (R,S, T, P ) and SY = (R, T, S, P ).
sX =
D(p,q,SX)
D(p,q,1)
, sY =
D(p,q,SY)
D(p,q,1)
(4)
2.2 Ergodic Markov Chain
According to [Akin, 2016], the following statements on sta-
tionary distribution are equivalent.
• There is a unique stationary distribution v in accordance
with M.
• The stationary distribution v is independent of the initial
distribution v1, and thus p0 and q0.
• There is no absorbing states (trapped states) in the
Markov chain.
• D(p,q,1) 6= 0
To avoid D(p,q,1) = 0, we assume q plays a com-
pletely mixed strategy, that is, qi ∈ (0, 1). For the con-
venience of defining best response, we assume pi ∈ [0, 1]
and p 6= (1, 1, 0, 0) (namely strategy Repeat). The last as-
sumption makes sense because if p plays Cooperate in the
first round, strategy Repeat is equivalent to Always Cooper-
ate, and otherwise to Always Defect. Under these assump-
tions, we can prove D(p,q,1) 6= 0 with the SMT solver
Z3 [De Moura and Bjørner, 2008].
Theorem 1. Assume pi ∈ [0, 1] and qi ∈ (0, 1), and that
p 6= (1, 1, 0, 0), then D(p,q,1) < 0.
Proof. The negation of Theorem 1 is, ∃p,q( ∧
i=1,2,3,4
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
) ∧ ( ∧
j=1,2,3,4
0 < qj < 1
)
∧ (p 6= (1, 1, 0, 0)) ∧ (D(p,q,1) ≥ 0) (5)
Z3 returns “unsatisfiable” to (5), meaning that its value is
always False. Thus Theorem 1 is always True.
In practice we accelerate this proof with domain knowl-
edge. We first prove that D(p,q,1) is monotonic to pi by
calculating derivatives(see also proof of Thm 2), then calcu-
late extrema by letting pi ∈ {0, 1}. Since all extrema are less
than zero, the determinant is less than zero.
2.3 Symbolic Calculation
Theorem 2 (Monotonicity). Suppose pi ∈ [0, 1] and qi ∈
(0, 1), p 6= (1, 1, 0, 0), sX , sY are defined in equation (4),
and z ∈ {p1, ..., p4, q1, ..., q4}.
When all variables in {p1, ..., p4, q1, ..., q4}\{z} are fixed,
sX is monotonic to z.
Proof. According to Theorem 1, D(p,q,1) 6= 0.
sX =
D(p,q,SX)
D(p,q,1)
For simplicity, let
M = D(p,q,SX), N = D(p,q,1)
Then
sX = M
/
N
Without loss of generality, get partial derivative to p1,
∂sX
∂p1
=
∂M
/
∂p1 ·N − ∂N
/
∂p1 ·M
N2
(6)
Let
U = ∂M
/
∂p1 ·N − ∂N
/
∂p1 ·M
Again, get partial derivative of U to p1,
∂U
/
∂p1 = 0
In Eq. (6), since N2 > 0, and the numerator is not
a function of p1, we can draw the conclusion that, when
{p2, p3, p4, q1, q2, q3, q4} are fixed, sX is monotonic in terms
of p1.
Similarly, sX is also monotonic to any variable in pi, qi
when other variables are fixed.
As symbolic calculations of determinant are laboursome,
we use a Python library SymPy [Meurer et al., 2017] and dou-
ble checked with MATLAB.
Given a fixed completely mixed strategy q, we want to
compute its best response p. Theorem 2 implies that there
exists a pure one-memory strategy best response. We only
need to enumerate all pure strategy p, and one of them must
be a best response to q.
Theorem 3. There always exists an one-memory pure strat-
egy best response to completely mixed one-memory strategies.
[Press and Dyson, 2012] did some experiments to show
that evolutionary players who evolve to get better payoff will
finally reach the optimal reward but they didn’t prove it ana-
lytically. Actually this property follows from Theorem 2. No
matter where a strategy begins, it will finally evolve to the
best response. In other words, there is no local maxima.
We are now able to compute all extreme values of sX by
letting pi = 0 or pi = 1. The result is denoted as Fk, where
k =
∑4
i=1 pi ∗ 24−i. For instance, when p = (1, 1, 1, 1),
F15 =
−R ∗ q3 + S ∗ q1 − S
q1 − q3 − 1
Some other Fk has a much more complex expression. We’ll
not show them due to limited space but readers can refer to
our source code for details. Notice that F12 is not considered
as it corresponds to Repeat strategy, p = (1, 1, 0, 0). Some
formulas turn out to have the same value, that is,
F0 = F4 = F8, F13 = F14 = F15
The corresponding strategies always receive the same payoff
whatever the co-player’s strategy is, we call such strategies
equivalent.
Theorem 4 (Equivalent). When playing agaisnt completely
mixed strategies, the following strategies are equivalent.
(0, 0, 0, 0) ≡ (0, 1, 0, 0) ≡ (1, 0, 0, 0)
(1, 1, 0, 1) ≡ (1, 1, 1, 0) ≡ (1, 1, 1, 1)
Duplicates will not be considered in the rest of this paper,
and the set of distinct expressions is defined as,
F = {F0, F1, F2, F3, F5, F6, F7, F9, F10, F11, F15} (7)
2.4 Theorem Discovery
With concrete values of (R,S,T,P), when strategy q is given,
we can simply compute all values in F so that the strategy
corresponding to the largest value is a best response. Our ex-
periments show that concrete values of (R,S,T,P) really mat-
ter. When the concrete setting of the IPD varies, the best
responses to some strategies also change. But some general
theorems are discovered with SMT solver Z3.
The knowledge base is defined according to the constraints
of the IPD and mixed one-memory strategies. In this section,
⊃ means “logical imply” , ≡ means “logical equivalent” and
¬ means “logical not”. Theorems are proved by refutation.
Definition 1 (Knowledge Base).
KB ≡ ( ∧
i=1,2,3,4
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
) ∧ ( ∧
i=1,2,3,4
0 < qi < 1
)
∧ (T > R > P > S) ∧ (2R > T + S) (8)
If a strategy is less cooperative under a better situation,
there is no reason to cooperate with him. As T > R > P > S
is the setting of the prisoner’s dilemma, column player’s pref-
erence isCD  CC  DD  DC. If his strategy q satisfies
q3 ≤ q1 ≤ q4 ≤ q2, then there is no chance of reciprocity.
See Table 2 for this correspondence.
Theorem 5. If strategy q = {q1, q2, q3, q4} satisfies q3 ≤
q1 ≤ q4 ≤ q2, then Always Defect is its best response .
Proof. First, we give a formal representation of this theorem.
∀p,q, R, S, T, P ,
KB ∧ (q3 ≤ q1 ≤ q4 ≤ q2) ⊃
∧
F ′∈F\{F0}
F0 > F
′ (9)
Eq. (9) is equivalent to, ∀p,q, R, S, T, P ,
¬(KB ∧ (q3 ≤ q1 ≤ q4 ≤ q2)) ∨ ∧
F ′∈F\{F0}
F0 > F
′ (10)
This theorem can be proved by conclusion refutation, and the
negation of Eq. (10) is, ∃p,q, R, S, T, P ,(KB ∧ (q3 ≤ q1 ≤ q4 ≤ q2)) ∧ ∨
F ′∈F\{F0}
F0 ≤ F ′ (11)
which is equivalent to,∨
F ′∈F\{F0}
(KB ∧ (q3 ≤ q1 ≤ q4 ≤ q2) ∧ F0 ≤ F ′) (12)
Z3 returns “unsatisfiable” to equation (12), implying that its
negation(i.e. Theorem 5) is always true.
A natural corollary of Theorem 5 is, if q1 = q2 = q3 = q4,
then Always Defect is a best response. One famous example
of such strategy is Random, i.e. q = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5). This
corollary illustrates that if some player is indifferent to the
outcome of previous round, there is no reason to cooperate
with him. More discussion on this property and backward
inducation can be found in Section 4.3.
Some other interesting theorems are discovered on the
neighbor of Mischief strategy defined by [Press and Dyson,
2012]. Such strategy is also called equalizer. We only show
the theorems together with their formal representations as the
proofs are very similar.
Definition 2 (MisChief). A MisChief strategy is an one-
memory strategy q = (q1, q2, q3, q4) defined as,
MC ≡ q2 = q1(T − P )− (1 + q4)(T −R)
R− P ∧
q3 =
(1− q1)(P − S) + q4(R− S)
R− P (13)
Theorem 6 (Mischief). While playing with MisChief strategy
q = (q1, q2, q3, q4), every strategy of p receives the same
average payoff. Formally, ∀p,q, R, S, T, P
KB ∧MC ∧ (q2 = q2) ∧ (q3 = q3) ⊃
∧
Fi,Fj∈F
Fi = Fj
Theorem 7 (MisTort). While playing with strategy q =
(q1, q2, q3, q4) s.t. q2 < q2, q3 = q3, Always Cooperate is
a best response. Formally, ∀p,q, R, S, T, P ,
KB ∧MC ∧ (q2 < q2) ∧ (q3 = q3) ⊃
∧
F ′∈F\{F15}
F15 > F
′
Theorem 8. While playing with strategy q = (q1, q2, q3, q4)
s.t. q2 = q2,q3 > q3, Always Defect is a best response. For-
mally, ∀p,q, R, S, T, P ,
KB ∧MC ∧ (q2 = q2) ∧ (q3 > q3) ⊃
∧
F ′∈F\{F0}
F0 > F
′
Figure 1: MisTort Strategy q = (0.9, 0.5, 0.2, 0.1)
We call the strategy in Theorem 7 MisTort because it’s on
the neighbor of MisChief strategy and shares the property of
extortionate strategies in [Press and Dyson, 2012], to which
the best response is Always Cooperate. Due to similar prop-
erty, readers may guess that one may be the a subclass of the
other. However, there turns out to be no intersection between
MisTort and extortionate strategies.
Theorem 9. There is no intersection between extortionate
strategy and MisTort strategy.
Proof. Extortionate strategy(EX ) is defined in [Press and
Dyson, 2012],
EX ≡ q1 = 1− φ(χ− 1)R− P
P − S
∧ q2 = 1− φ(1 + χT − P
P − S )
∧ q3 = φ(χ+ T − P
P − S ) ∧ q4 = 0
∧ 0 < φ ≤ (P − S)
(P − S) + χ(T − P ) ∧ χ > 1
The negation of Theorem 9 is, ∃q,
(
∧
i=1,2,3,4
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1) ∧ EX ∧MC ∧ (q2 < q2)
∧ (q3 = q3) ∧ (T > R > P > S) ∧ (2R > T + S) (14)
Z3 returns “unsat”, meaning Theorem 9 is always true.
One specific instance of MisTort strategy can be calculated
by letting q1 = 0.9, q4 = 0.1 and (R,S, T, P ) = (3, 0, 5, 1).
From Eq. (14) we can calculate out q2 < 0.7, q3 = 0.2.
A possible MisTort strategy is, q = (0.9, 0.5, 0.2, 0.1). We
enumerate a number of strategy p to play against this q =
(0.9, 0.5, 0.2, 0.1), and the average payoff of both players is
shown in Figure 1. All pairs of payoffs (sX , sY ) form a
compact convex hull, and the case that p = (1, 1, 1, 1) is
receives highest payoff. The figure implies that Always Co-
operate is a best response to q, leading to a payoff where
sX = 2.0, sY = 3.67.
3 Repeated Games and MDP
3.1 Repeated Game and K-memory Strategy
A finite, 2-person normal form game is a tuple (N,A, u),
where
• N = {1, 2} is the set of two players.
• A = A1×A2, whereAi is a finite set of actions available
to player i. Each vector a = (a1, a2) ∈ A is called an
action profile (or outcome).
• u = (u1, u2), where ui : A 7→ R is a real-valued utility
(or payoff) function for player i.
This stage game is played for infinite rounds. A player’s
payoff is defined as the average payoff of the stage game
in the limit [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008]. Similar to
Eq. (1), given an infinite sequence of payoffs u(1)i , u
(2)
i ,... for
player i, the average payoff of i is limk→∞
∑k
j=1 u
(j)
i
/
k.
A k-memory mixed strategy of player i is a function that
maps k action profiles to a distribution on actions,
pi : A
k 7→ ∆(Ai) (15)
Given previous k actions profiles s ∈ Ak, the probability of
taking action ai ∈ Ai is written as pi(s, ai). In the start of the
game, there aren’t k action profiles, in this case we fill empty
action profile with action c. Our conclusions don’t rely on the
outcomes of the first k rounds, see Thm 11.
3.2 Markov Decision Process
Now we compute the best response to a k-memory strategy.
The first question is how much memory is required to be a
best response. According to [Press and Dyson, 2012], short-
est memory sets the rule of the game, so that it needs to be
at most k-memory. On the other hand, any strategy with less
than k-memory can be represented by a k-memory strategy.
Then we know k-memory strategy should be exactly enough.
This problem is also discussed in [Chen et al., 2017].
Both players take k-memory strategies. Assume player 2
plays a completely mixed strategy p2, namely ∀s ∈ S, a2 ∈
A2, p2(s, a2) > 0, then from player 1’s point of view, his
action and payoff can be modeled as the following MDP.
• Actions: same as A1 in the repeated game.
• States: S = Ak, the set of vectors of k action profiles,
indexed by 1,2,...,k, from farthest to most recent. Any
s1:k ∈ S refers to k continuous action profiles. When
there comes a new action profile (a1, a2), it goes to a
new state s′ = s2:k + (a1, a2), which drops the farthest
action profile s1 and appends (a1, a2).
• Transition Function. When player 1 takes action a1, the
states transits from state s to s′ = s2:k + (a1, a2) with
probability T (s, a1, s′) = p2(s, a2). At every state s,
for any action a1,
∑
s′ T (s, a1, s
′) = 1.
• Reward R(s, a1) = u1(sk),∀a1 ∈ A1, meaning player
1’s utility of the most recent action profile.
A mixed policy pi assigns a probability distribution of ac-
tions to each state. Formally, pi : S 7→ ∆(A1). For each
s ∈ S, the probability of taking action a1 ∈ A1 is writ-
ten as pi(s, a1). A completely mixed policy is pi(s, a1) >
0,∀s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1. Π+ is the set of all completely mixed
policies, which is a subset of all policies Π. A pure policy is
that, for each s ∈ S, there is exactly one a1 ∈ A1 satisfying
pi(s, a1) = 1. From the definition of state S and strategy in
Eq. (15), we can easily see that every policy pi corresponds to
a strategy p1.
Player 1 walks among states for infinite rounds, starting
from any state s ∈ S. At each round, it takes an action ac-
cording to current state and its policy pi, then it goes into a
new state. This agent receives a sequence of rewards, namely
R1, R2, ..., Rj , ..., and the final score ρpi(s) is calculated by
the expectation of average, formally,
ρpi(s) = lim
k→∞
Epi
{∑kj=0Rj
k
}
Our goal is to find an optimal policy pi∗ that maximizes the
expectation of average payoff, ∀pi, ρpi∗(s) ≥ ρpi(s). We will
show that the initial state s doesn’t matter, for our MDP.
3.3 Solving Average-Payoff MDPs
There is a detailed explanation on average-payoff MDPs in
textbook [Puterman, 2014]. Our results in this part are mainly
based on propositions and theorems in [Filar and Schultz,
1988], which are introduced as lemmas. To be specific,
Lemma 1 is from paragraph 2, section 1; Definition 3 is from
Definition 1.1, and Lemma 2 is from Theorem 2.1 in [Filar
and Schultz, 1988].
Lemma 1. While computing optimal policy, it is sufficient to
consider pure policies.
A policy pi induces a Markov chain on states S with tran-
sition matrix M(pi), whose entries Mst(pi) denote the prob-
ability of transition from state s to state t when policy pi is
followed. For τ being a nonnegative integer, Mτ (pi) denotes
the τ -th power of square matrix M(pi), and Mτst(pi) denotes
an entry in it.
Definition 3. An MDP is communicating if, for every pair of
states s, t ∈ S, there exists a pure policy pi and an integer
τ ≥ 1 such that Mτst(pi) is strictly positive.
Lemma 2. Let Π+ be the set of completely mixed policies.
The following two conditions are equivalent.
• An MDP is communicating.
• Every policy pi+ ∈ Π+ induces an irreducible M(pi+).
Since we have assumed that player 2 takes a completely
mixed strategy p2, for every pi+ ∈ Π+, the induced matrix
M(pi+) is irreducible. In other words, when both players take
completely mixed strategies, there is no transient state in the
corresponding Markov chain, because it’s possible to append
any action profile to any state.
Theorem 10. The MDP in section 3.2 is communicating.
Its optimal policy can be calculated by linear programming,
which is independent of starting state. If pi∗ is an optimal
policy starting from state s, then it is also an optimal policy
starting from any other state s′.
Then there is a theorem in repeated games.
Theorem 11. There always exists a k-memory pure strategy
best response to k-memory completely mixed strategy in in-
finitely repeated games, which is independent of the initial k
outcomes.
Such pure strategy best response can be computed with ex-
isting MDP solvers, e.g. MDPtoolbox [Chade`s et al., 2014].
As an example, we compute the best response to Stochas-
tic Tif-for-2-Tats(STF2T). The game is IPD in Table 1 with
(R,S,T,P)=(3,0,5,1). STF2T cooperates with probability 0.1
when the other player defects for continuous two rounds,
and cooperates with probability 0.9 otherwise. MDPtoolbox
solves this model, the best response is to play c and d alter-
natively, and the average payoff is 2.67. See our source code
for details.
4 Discussion
4.1 Multi-agent Tournament
In the previous sections we have discussed how to calculate
the best response in two-agent repeated games. Our result
mainly relies on the fact that there always exists a pure strat-
egy best response. Now we consider the best response in
multi-agent tournaments, which may not be a pure strategy.
Due to the complexity of symbolic calculations, we con-
duct experiments of a multi-agent IPD tournament instead of
giving an analytical proof. Consider a tournament of eleven
one-memory agents, namely one p, nine q and one u. Sup-
pose (R,S, T, P ) = (3, 0, 5, 1), q = (0.9, 0.5, 0.2, 0.1) and
u = (0.4, 0.8, 0.2, 0.6), we want to compute the optimal p
that maximizes his payoff. Strategy p plays with every q
and u respectively and the final score takes the average of all
games, which can be calculated according to Eq. (4),
sp = 0.9 ∗ D(p,q,SX)
D(p,q,1)
+ 0.1 ∗ D(p,u,SX)
D(p,u,1)
(16)
In two-agent games, there always exists a pure strategy best
response. As is shown in Theorem 7 and Theorem 5, the best
response to q is Always Cooperate, while the best response to
u is Always Defect. Now we consider whether there is a pure
strategy one-memory best response p∗ in this tournament .
First we let p be a pure strategy and compute the values
of sp. There are 24 − 1 = 15 pure strategies, where Repeat
strategy p = (1, 1, 0, 0) is excluded. Among them, strategy
Tit-for-Tat p = (1, 0, 1, 0) receives highest payoff of 1.90.
However, after we consider mixed strategies, we found that
strategy p = (1, 0.9, 0, 0.1) reaches a higher payoff of 2.02.
This specific example shows that there may not exist a pure
strategy best response in general multi-agent tournaments.
4.2 Limitation of Z3
Although Z3 is effective in solving linear constraints and suc-
cessfully prove our theorems, it sometimes fails to give a so-
lution in several hours when the constraint is a non-linear
combination of several variables. We take comprehensive
measures to overcome this challenge. (1) Avoid quantifiers.
A mixture of ∀ and ∃ prevents us from efficient proof. We
avoid using both quantifiers and manually simplify some for-
mulas. (2) Simplify formulas. We take advantage of domain
knowledge to remove fractions, such as in the proof of Theo-
rem 1 we first prove monotonicity and prove all extreme val-
ues are less than zero. (3) Break down. We solve one clause
of conjunction or disjunction at one time. Usually a theorems
requires every clause has the same value of true or false, such
as Eq. (12). (4) Remove variables. When SMT cannot solve
a theorem, we have to replace some variables with concrete
values to get some conjectures or a weaker theorem. In sec-
tion 4.1 we compute a counter-example instead of prove it
analytically.
4.3 Backward Induction
There has been many debates on backward induction [Kreps
et al., 1982][Binmore, 1997]. For finite n round IPD, playing
defect is the best strategy in the one-shot game at n-th round
because there is no further possibility of reciprocity. Since
both rational players will play defect in the n-th round, there
is no reason to cooperate in the (n-1)-th round. By backward
induction, Always Defect is the only equilibrium of finite it-
erated prisoner’s dilemma.
To explain the emergence of cooperation, it is usually as-
sumed that the game is played for infinite rounds, or an un-
known number of rounds[Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981]. Al-
though this assumption invalidates backward induction, there
still lacks an explanation of cooperation. Actually, when peo-
ple conduct backward induction, they implicitly assume that
the outcome of previous round has no effect on the decision
of current round. According to the corollary of Theorem
5, when someone is indifferent to the outcome of previous
round, there is no reason to cooperate with him. Therefore,
we hold the view that the emergence of cooperation cannot be
explained without taking previous history into consideration.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we compute best responses to mixed strategies
in repeated games. Our main result shows that there always
exists a pure strategy best response in two-agent repeated
games. Based on this result, we analyze one-memory strate-
gies, give the method to compute best response, and discover
new theorems in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The work
enhances our comprehension of the IPD and explains the evo-
lutionary behavior left over in [Press and Dyson, 2012].
We generalize this result to the best response to k-memory
strategies. Such problem is modeled as MDP and solved with
existing solvers. In a multi-agent tournament, however, there
may not exist a pure strategy best response. As a result,
computing the best strategy in a tournament where an agent
should take the same strategy to all other agents is still an
open question.
As most calculations and proofs are conducted by com-
puter programs, we release all our source code for verifica-
tion. Source code is uploaded as additional files.
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